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I.! ABSTRACT 
 
Mohammed Hedadji 
The Impact of Collateral Structure on Microfinance Lending 
(Under the direction of Dr. Olga Hawn) 
 
At its conception, microfinance was a lending mechanism designed to alleviate 
poverty by providing group-structured lending to those who could not otherwise receive 
financing. As it has spread into new markets, microfinance lending has grown and 
changed significantly — especially as the model was adopted in the United States. While 
its goal is still to fund and empower entrepreneurial ventures by lending to the poor, the 
payment and collateral structure of microfinance in the U.S. is drastically different from 
the original microfinance model established by the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh.  
The most notable difference, the lack of social collateral, has contributed to higher 
default rates (and thus, higher operating costs) and slower growth among microfinance 
institutions in the U.S., relative to much of the world.  Higher default rates are important 
because they have pushed U.S. micro-lenders to find new ways to mitigate the risk of 
these loans, including the use of individual lending models and/or physical collateral. 
Prior literature has discussed the various forms of collateral available to microlenders, 
their potential uses in the U.S., and the impact of each on operating costs and margins. 
But there has been little research conducted surrounding lender meetings/interactions as a 
potential form of collateral. Furthermore, little research has been done to quantify the 
effectiveness and importance of these forms of collateral from the borrower’s 
perspective. Overall, the voice of the borrower has been largely excluded from the loan-
structuring process. 
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To address these gaps, I conducted research with borrowers from two 
microlending institutions: The North Carolina Rural Center and The Women’s 
Microfinance Initiative of Uganda. I selected these two lenders to compare and contrast 
different loan features and collateral tools in a domestic and international setting. 
Additionally, the two samples represented one struggling microlender (NC Rural Center) 
and one successful high-growth lending institution (WMI-Uganda). My findings 
suggested that more frequent lender meetings/interactions can potentially help reduce 
late/missed loan payments.  Additionally, my findings indicated that incremental 
professional development courses could potentially serve as collateral for borrowers, 
influencing borrowers to repay their loans, and improve their ability to do so (thus 
reducing overall risk). 
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II.! INTRODUCTION 
 
Microfinance is a popular lending solution for low-income and developing 
regions of the world. This lending solution has grown considerably since its inception and 
is projected to continue to grow at an average of 19.3% until 2019 (Hug, C., 2014). 
However, microfinance institutions (MFIs) vary significantly with with respect to success 
and lending strategy across different regions. As a relatively young lending solution, 
microfinance has not yet been studied as thoroughly as older lending functions. Most 
studies focus on the performance or impact of microfinance within a country, region, or 
specific MFI, with the existence of some notable global comparative studies. Limited 
customer-focused research has been conducted within the space. 
A.! Research Question 
 
 This study seeks to answer the question of how MFI lending strategies — 
specifically implemented loan features and collateral structures — impact borrowers’ 
perception and motivation to repay. Borrower surveys were conducted on groups from 
the United States (The NC Rural Center) and Uganda (Women’s Microfinance Initiative) 
to assess the importance of various forms of collateral from the customer’s perspective 
and to draw correlations between loan features, borrower perception, and repayment.  
 Survey results were analyzed quantitatively and qualitatively and used to form 
conclusions and provide recommendations to The NC Rural Center and U.S. MFIs in 
general on improving lending strategy and loan repayments. 
B.! My Interest in Microfinance 
 
My interest in microfinance stems from a course I took in Santiago, Chile as an 
exchange student. Inspired by the growth and impact of microfinance in Latin America 
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and across the world, I dove further into the subject. My passion for microfinance was 
developed after reading Muhammad Yunus’s Banker to the Poor (1999). Yunus discusses 
his experiences with poverty and inequality in his home country of Bangladesh. He 
implemented a micro-lending program, called the Grameen Foundation, which stimulated 
entrepreneurship and promoted growth in impoverished areas by providing loans for 
small-scale ventures such as farming and weaving (Yunus, 1999). As a result, even the 
most underprivileged Bangladeshis were given the opportunity to escape poverty — a 
seemingly impossible feat before the establishment of this program. Since Yunus 
established the Grameen Foundation, the use of microfinance lending has grown 
exponentially, successfully alleviating poverty across the globe.  
But upon further research, I was surprised to learn that microfinance lending has 
not found the same success in the United States. Understanding that a number of 
influencers — ranging from social and cultural values to government policies — have 
impacted the success of microfinance, I set out to learn what factors have promoted or 
deterred the success of microfinance in the United States. My research will ultimately 
seek to provide recommendations to the NC Rural Center, a local micro-lending 
institution, on its lending strategy and use of collateral.  
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III.! OVERVIEW OF MICROFINANCE 
 
In this section, I will define microfinance and provide a brief overview of its 
history. I will also discuss the current situation within the U.S. and the relationship 
between default rates, interest rates, and collateral structures for micro-lending solutions. 
Lastly, I will spotlight the NC Rural Center and how its current situation relates to larger 
microfinance trends in the U.S. 
A.! Microfinance Definition 
 
Microfinance is defined as “formal and informal institutions offering 
financial services to the poor” (Brau & Woller, 2004). The original microfinance model 
aimed to provide small (micro) loans with low interest rates to the poorest individuals to 
help establish and develop their entrepreneurial ventures. Microfinance models since 
have adapted their practices slightly, but still aspire to extend financial inclusion to 
groups that were previously thought of as un-lendable (Yunus, 1999).  
B.! History of Microfinance 
 
Micro-lending has existed for centuries, arising in various regions by different 
names throughout history. From West Africa to Mexico, microfinance lending systems 
were established well before Yunus’s Grameen Foundation (Helms & Goodwin-Groen, 
2006). While micro-lending popped up in certain areas, the vast majority of societies 
viewed the poor as “unreliable” borrowers due to the lack of tangible collateral they 
offered (Yunus, 1999). Therefore, lending institutions largely avoided low-income 
populations, which meant microfinance saw little to no growth for centuries (Helms & 
Goodwin-Groen, 2006). 
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In the 1970s, Muhammad Yunus — who is widely considered the father of 
modern day microfinance — experimented with group-based micro-lending. Recognizing 
the impact of social push, especially in Bangladesh, Yunus implemented loans that 
effectively established social, rather than physical collateral. The Grameen model 
established small groups (5 to 7 members) consisting of mostly female non-family 
members. These loan groups established an internal monitoring system, holding each 
other accountable for repaying loans. In Yunus’s model, a single member missing a 
payment meant repercussions for the entire group. With two forms of collateral —social 
collateral and the promise of future loans — pushing borrowers to repay, the Grameen 
model proved extremely successful, especially in areas with similar social constructs. 
Yunus’s microfinance model spread across the world, with slight changes, bringing with 
it financial inclusion for tens of millions of impoverished borrowers (Yunus, 1999). 
Hundreds of thousands of microfinance lending institutions exist around the world today.  
C.! Microfinance in the United States 
 
Microfinance lending models have varied in their effectiveness and success 
throughout different global markets. Microfinance was adopted in earnest within the 
United States in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Lieberman, Mudd, & Goodeve, 2012), 
but has failed to find the same success as many of its international counterparts. An 
estimated 367 MFIs existed in the U.S. as of 2012, which represents ~18% growth in the 
past decade, which is below the international average (Lieberman et al., 2012). A number 
of key factors, including default rates, interest rates, and the use of certain forms of 
collateral have contributed to this limited growth in recent decades. In this section, I will 
address the role that each of these factors has played in the success of U.S. microfinance 
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and the decisions-making strategy of MFIs. 
Default Rates: 
 As Yunus (1999) highlights, microfinance differentiates itself from other lending 
models because of its ability to maintain impressively low default rates, while lending to 
the the otherwise unbankable. Because low-income borrowers typically lack the assets to 
back their loans (otherwise called collateral, which will be discusses later), minimizing 
loan defaults is especially imperative to the success of micro-lenders. Yunus’s model, and 
many of those that followed internationally, thrived because of the ability to prevent loan 
default. Some microfinance institutions, such as the Grameen Bank and The Women’s 
Microfinance Initiative of Uganda have boasted repayment rates as high as 98% in the 
past (Nietert, 2016). This level of risk-mitigation has accelerated the growth of 
microfinance in these regions, promoting the success of the microfinance institutions that 
are established. 
 While some microfinance institutions have succeeded to sustain high repayment 
rates, the story has largely followed a different tune with respect to default rates in the 
U.S. On average, U.S. microloans have a 9.1% default rate, which is far higher than the 
averages in areas such as South Asia, where average default rates were 3.03% 
(Lieberman et al., 2012). This phenomenon has further increased the risk of lending to 
the poor and limited the success of microfinance lending in the U.S. Especially 
considering the limited options that U.S. lenders have to combat higher loan default rates 
— which is linked directly to the available collateral structures in the U.S. versus other 
regions — the burden of higher loan default has stymied the growth of microlending 
significantly. Lastly, higher default rates — specifically the administrative costs 
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associated with repayment collection — drive up already-high operating costs for U.S. 
microlenders and make it more difficult to do business (Chakrabarty, & Bass, 2013).  
Interest Rates: 
 Interest rates also play a pivotal role in influencing the decision-making processes 
of MFIs, both from an operational standpoint and with respect to affordability for 
borrowers. Microfinance institutions, and really all lending institutions, lean on interest to 
fund the back-end costs of lending and to establish profitability. Interest rates are driven 
by a number of factors, including default rate and available collateral, that ultimately 
determine a lender’s profit margin and overall success. Rosenberg et al. (2013) 
determined the key drivers of microfinance interest rates to be as follows: 
 !"#$%$&#'()#$(%) = ./0(12$%)#3"4'562$"&$) + .88(9:)"'9:&&) −'(<:==)#$%)='>#)"?3"4) + (%'@%:A3#'B)%43")  ' ' '''
 In short, each of these factors creates upward (or downward) pressure on interest 
rates. This formula serves as a simplified equation, boiling down how each of these key 
factors drives interest rates. Beyond interest rates, these factors also have an impact on 
the decisions that lenders make and the loan features and collateral structures that they 
ultimately include. Operating expenses, loan losses (or default risk), and profit margins 
drive interest rates up, while collateral standing — a given borrower’s available collateral 
(whether tangible or intangible) — drives interest rates down. Although, often times, 
profit margins are dictated by interest rates rather than the other way around.  
 In the U.S., there is a higher level of relative upward pressure on interest rates, 
largely due to these three key factors. Differences in collection practices and social 
integration have led to higher operating costs in the U.S., relative to the world average 
Microfinance and Collateral Strategy 7"
(Chakrabarty, & Bass, 2013). Additionally, as mentioned before, higher default rates also 
create upward pressure on interest rates. Lastly, the lack of available collateral, namely 
social collateral, also impacts both interest rates and lending strategy. Collateral will be 
further explained in the following section. These factors have driven interest rates to an 
extent, but their impact has been felt more profoundly by the MFIs in the form of lower 
profit margins. This, understandably, has contributed significantly to the slower growth 
of MFIs in the U.S. 
 Despite the upward pressure that exists on MFI interest rates in the U.S., there has 
been little evidence to suggest that U.S. microfinance rates are significantly higher than 
the world average. While exact interest rate averages are hard to pinpoint, largely because 
of the long-standing issue of transparency in the U.S., Lieberman et al. (2012), estimated 
that average interest rates in the U.S. were 10.8%. According to Kneiding and Rosenberg 
(2008), the international average for microfinance interest rates is 35%, which is 
significantly higher than the predicted U.S. average. Kneiding and Rosenberg cite a 
number of outliers, such as Uzbekistan who charge rates around 80% as potential drivers 
of high international averages. Still, however, there is little evidence to suggest that U.S. 
interest rates are higher than the national average.  
A study by Rosenberg et al. (2009) concluded that microfinance interest rates are 
not too high in the U.S.  High microfinance interest rates have been tied to higher default 
rates in other regions, due to the bottom-line impact they have on entrepreneurial success 
for borrowers. Interestingly, interest rates do not seem to be the primary determinant for 
the higher on-average loan defaults in the U.S.  
This brings attention to available collateral, the other key contributing factor to 
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loan defaults. This phenomenon drove me to focus my study on collateral structures and 
their profound impact on repayment and overall MFI success. 
Collateral Structures: 
 As mentioned, collateral plays an imperative role to the repayment of loans and 
the overall success of a MFI. In short, collateral serves two purposes for a lender: 
1.! To influence borrowers to repay loans 
2.! To recuperate some/all of the losses in the case of default. 
For a number of reasons, the first purpose will be the focus of this thesis. Firstly, 
since microfinance loans target poor borrowers, collateral rarely serves as ample 
coverage for the loan in the case of default. With limited physical collateral available, 
lenders turn to other forms of collateral — both tangible and intangible — to reduce risk. 
The establishment of collateral structures such as group lending (and social collateral) 
largely aims to reduce loan default (1), rather than recuperate losses (2).  
Additionally, the recuperation of losses is a largely reactive function of collateral, 
which is more difficult to change, relative to the circumstance. Conversely, promoting 
loan repayment is an active use of collateral, and has a greater impact on default rates 
overall.  
When structuring loans, MFIs are faced with a number of options (and 
limitations) with respect to the collateral that will back a loan. Naturally, loans provided 
through microlending programs have inherently higher risk than those of other lending 
solutions. Thus, the effective use of collateral is vital in limiting default and possibly 
recuperating losses. I will discuss the different types of collateral and its availability in 
the U.S. in more detail throughout the literature review.  
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Loan Feature Decision Making: 
 Another important caveat to note with respect to operating costs and their role as a 
key driver of interest rates is their residual impact on the decision-making process for 
lenders. With existing pressure on interest rate margins, lenders must tailor the 
extensiveness of their loan features to match the availability of operational funding. For 
example, Chakrabarty and Bass (2013) mention that some lenders forego offering 
services such as personal/professional development programs in order to reduce operating 
costs. These limitations increase the importance of implementing only the most impactful 
and effective loan features. This notion motivates part of this study, as I seek to 
recommend the most effective loan features to the NC Rural Center.  
D.! NC Rural Center 
 The NC Rural Center, a local organization that serves North Carolina’s 80 rural 
counties, provides microfinance loans to the poor in rural areas. The center faces many of 
the issues addressed above, especially with respect to operating costs and available 
collateral. Below is a comprehensive breakdown of the loan services and features that the 
NC Rural Center offers, compared to national U.S. averages (Lieberman et al., 2012) & 
(Rosenberg, 2009). 
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Table 1: Loan Services & Features, NC Rural Center vs. US 
Loan Feature NC Rural Center Average U.S. Loan 
Lending Model Individual Lending Model* Individual Lending Model 
Primary Market Low-Income Rural Borrowers Low-Income / Variable 
Interest Rate U.S. Prime + 4% (8-9%) 10.8% 
Collateral •! Home/Property 
Collateral 
•! Credit Score Rating 
•! Promise of Future Loan 
•! Strict Repayment 
•! Home/Property 
Collateral 
•! Credit Score Rating 
•! Promise of Future Loan 
•! Strict Repayment 
•! Other 
Required Meetings 
With Lender 
No No  
(Exceptions Apply)* 
Business/Professional 
Development 
Program  
One time only. Prior to 
receiving loan. 
Yes. 
Depth/Frequency Varies. 
Default Rates ~13% 9.1% 
*In the past, the NC Rural Center has experimented with the use of a group lending structure. 
After a highly successful first round, strategic default and increasing administrative expenses 
plagued the effectiveness of successive rounds of lending. Ultimately, the NC Rural Center 
returned to an individual lending model after three rounds of loans.  
 
Despite some differences in loan features, the NC Rural Center serves as a good, 
relative representation of the U.S. microfinance landscape. Some incongruences do exist, 
such as the fact that the NC Rural Center has slightly lower interest rates than the national 
average and slightly higher default rates. Nonetheless, the issues facing NC Rural Center 
parallel those facing lenders in the larger U.S. microfinance market. By studying, 
analyzing, and ultimately making recommendations for the NC Rural Center, I can 
extend some of my recommendations to U.S. MFIs as well.  
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IV.! LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This section will review the literature available on collateral structures and risk-
mitigating tools across the microfinance landscape. In addition, it will discuss the 
structural differences between U.S.-based micro-lending collateral and international 
microfinance institutions (MFIs). In this literature review, I will discuss:  
•! Group vs. Individual Lending Structure 
•! Social Collateral in the United States 
•! Other Risk-Mitigating Tools 
•! Applying These Tools in the U.S.  
In this section, I will also work to point out the gaps within the relevant literature. 
Specifically, I will discuss the lack of research surrounding lender meetings as a potential 
form of (social) collateral and the absence of the borrower voice in the loan-structuring 
process. By outlining the information available and comparing the research that has been 
conducted, I will use this literature review as the foundation for my research 
methodology and recommendations. 
A.! Group vs. Individual Lending Structure 
 
Group lending has been one of the most integral parts of microfinance since its 
conception. Yunus detailed the concept of group lending as it first appeared in the 
Grameen Bank — the MFI Yunus developed to combat poverty in Bangladesh. 
Borrowers who received loans from the Grameen Bank did so in groups of five or seven 
members, assuming joint responsibility for any loans they received (Yunus, 1999). 
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Lending methodologies have expanded since Yunus’s original model, modifying 
the group lending model that exists and even venturing away from the group model 
entirely. In general, three prominent lending methods exist. Two group lending methods: 
(1) Solidarity, and (2) Village Bank and one non-group lending method: (3) Individual 
dominate the microfinance landscape today (McGuire & Conroy, 2000a, 2000b). 
Solidarity Model: 
 The most common lending model for microfinance lending, the solidarity model 
is the modern implementation of Yunus’s original group lending method. Loan groups 
consist of five to seven group members who guarantee each other’s loans and attend 
regular meetings together. Self-monitoring tendencies within this model reduce operating 
costs for lenders as well.  
Village Bank Model: 
 Less common in international practice, but still prominent, the village banking 
model consists of “agencies” comprised of 30-50 village members. Loans are provided to 
individuals, who exist within a larger social group. Peer pressure and tight-knit social 
bonds motivate borrowers to repay in full. Funds from this structure are typically 
recycled to fund future loans within the same “agency.” 
Individual Model: 
 The individual model more closely parallels typical lending models for non-
microfinance loans. This model provides credit to clients on a person-to-person basis, 
establishing individual liability on each separate loan. This model is limited in the non-
tangible collateral it can produce. Additionally, loan screening and collection are highly 
centralized in this model, driving up operating costs for lenders.  
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In both group lending structures, each individual borrower’s ability to take out 
future loans depends on the ability of the group (or other individual borrowers) to avoid 
default. This structure establishes two forms of leverage for the lenders: tangible and 
social collateral.  
(1)!Tangible Collateral: Because loans are spread across the group, a loan can be 
repaid by the group in the event that one member defaults in a given period. Since 
missing a payment means compromising the ability of the entire group to attain 
future loans, the lender is protected from individual defaults by the rest of the 
group. 
(2)!Intangible (Social) Collateral: In an interwoven, network-based society, the social 
pressure from the other group members also pushes borrowers to make their 
payments. Lenders benefit from this social push because the groups self-police 
when payments are due. 
While group lending has been shifted and adjusted by other banks and MFIs since the 
1970s, it still remains a major part of microfinance lending models across the world. The 
latter, social collateral, is a major pillar of the microfinance model and cited by Yunus 
(1999) as the biggest benefit of group lending. Yunus attributes much of Grameen Bank’s 
success to the role that group liability serves to create collateral. 
Group lending’s necessity and benefit, however, have been contested by some. In 
Treb Allen’s Optimal (Partial) Group Liability in Microfinance Lending (2012), he 
highlights the shortcomings of the group lending structure as a pure form of collateral. 
Allen (2013) instead proposes a system of partial group liability, where individual 
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borrowers are not punished as heavily if members of their group default. Additionally, 
one of Allen’s biggest criticisms of the group liability model is its dependence on the 
cultural and social structure of the home country.  
According to Allen (2013), the United States is a good example of a society that 
doesn’t support group lending models well. The difficulty associated with implementing 
group lending in the United States — because of an inability to establish social collateral 
— has led many banks to turn entirely to individual liability. With a lack of collateral 
from social pressure, lenders have also implemented other forms of collateral and 
abandoned the effort to establish social collateral entirely in many cases (Allen, 2013). 
While Allen researched partial group liability in Mexico, a partial liability structure in the 
U.S. may offer lenders some level of collateral — though it is unlikely that the social 
collateral that Yunus describes could be achieved.   
B.! Social Collateral in the United States 
 
The absence of social collateral in the U.S. drives many of the decisions that MFIs 
make. The most notable decision, of course, is the movement away from group lending 
models to individual lending with largely tangible collateral. Considering the pivotal role 
that group lending and social collateral played in the success of early microfinance, 
according to Yunus (1999), it is important to continue researching the role (if any) that it 
could play in the collateral strategies of U.S. MFIs. Research surrounding this question 
poses one underlying question: Why doesn’t social collateral work in the United States? 
Why Doesn’t It Work? 
A number of reasons could account for social collateral’s lack of success in the 
U.S. The research on this topic differs slightly in the reasons offered to explain the 
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absence of social collateral in the U.S. microfinance market. Additionally, some broader 
cultural research can be used to deduce a possible explanation as well. Ultimately, 
research surrounds three possible reasons for the absence of social collateral: (1)) Social 
Construct/Infrastructure, (2) Strategic Default, and (3) Cultural Dimensions. 
Social Construct/Infrastructure: 
 Allen (2013) notes that one of the biggest undoings of social collateral may 
simply be the lack of feasibility for group lending in the U.S. Nietert (2016) noted that 
group lending thrives in areas with tight-knit societies, much like that of Bangladesh, 
where Yunus had so much success (Yunus, 1999). Village settings, where borrowers 
likely have pre-existing relationships, breed more successful group lending models and 
higher levels of social collateral.  
Therefore, the societal construct of the U.S. is cited by Allen as a major reason for 
social collateral’s failure. In settings such as the small-village lending groups in Yunus’s 
original model, borrowers could not escape the social pressure placed upon them by their 
village (Yunus, 1999). Without the same interconnection in U.S. society, the same level 
of social collateral is difficult to recreate.  
Additionally, Yunus (1999) and Bastelater (2006), both credit freedom of 
movement as a significant factor in the effectiveness of social collateral. Yunus discussed 
limited freedom of movement in Bangladesh well before the creation of the Grameen 
Model. In many settings, such as that which Yunus highlights in rural Bangladesh, the 
inability to escape one’s home town or village limits economic freedom and his/her 
ability to locate employment. Conversely, Feigenberg et al. (2010) notes that this is one 
of the keys to success for microlending models that rely on social collateral. The situation 
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is quite different in the U.S., and can be cited as yet another potential cause for the 
relative ineffectiveness of social collateral. In a microfinance setting, specifically when 
observing social collateral, the ability to relocate physically (and to a lesser extent, within 
subgroups of society) limits the effectiveness of social collateral.  
Still, in many cases, borrowers can be bound physically due to land-ownership or 
employment limitations. In an interview with Robyn Nietert, the President of The 
Women’s Microfinance Initiative, Nietert cited rural settings and military bases as areas 
where social collateral could be successfully implemented (Nietert, 2016). Therefore, 
while U.S. social construct and infrastructure limits the effectiveness of social collateral 
significantly, it doesn’t completely negate its potential success in certain settings. 
Strategic Default: 
 Without the same social consequences for defaulting on a loan, such as a 
tarnished reputation, strategic default is also a major risk for MFIs in the United States. 
Strategic default occurs when one (or all) of the borrowers in a group intentionally 
default on a loan in a group setting shortly after receiving it. By defaulting, borrowers 
pass on much of the liability to the remaining group members, while limiting personal 
exposure (Allen, 2013).  
Without the existence of social collateral, this problem persists, often times 
forcing lenders to move completely away from the group liability model — never 
allowing social collateral to begin forming in the first place. Another common issue with 
strategic default is the “race to the bottom” effect that it has on a loan group. Once one 
member defaults intentionally, it is not uncommon for the entire group lending structure 
to fall apart shortly after (Allen, 2013).  
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Cultural Dimensions: 
 Another possible reason for the failure of social collateral in the U.S. is based on 
broader research surrounding cultural dimensions in different countries around the world.  
Geert Hofstede (2001) conducted a study comparing six cultural dimensions in different 
countries. The first dimension, Individualism vs. Collectivism serves as a possible 
explanation for the success of social collateral in some areas and its failure in others. 
Below is a list of some areas where individual lending models exist vs group lending 
models (McGuire & Conroy, 2000a, 2000b). 
Individual Lending Model Group Lending Model 
•! United States 
•! Switzerland 
•! United Kingdom 
•! Chile 
•! Germany 
•! Ghana 
•! Bangladesh 
•! India 
•! Kenya 
•! China 
 
 Using Hofstede’s cultural dimension indicator to compare these countries, a clear 
trend exists distinguishing the two groups of countries. Below is a comparison between 
the countries above, on the basis of Hofstede’s first cultural dimension (Hofstede, 2010). 
 While it would be valuable to assess the cultural dimensions of Uganda, it was not 
one of the countries included in Hofstede’s analysis. Uganda’s relative level of 
collectivism can be predicted by using Kenya, its neighboring country. While it is likely 
that the cultural dimensions differ between the two countries, Kenya is still the best 
representative of Uganda’s level of collectivism.  
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Figure 1: Hofstede Cultural Dimensions by Country/Lending Model 
           Source: (Hofstede & Minkov, 2010) 
 
Not surprisingly, countries where the individual lending model persists — and 
thus social collateral is absent —display individualistic cultural dimensions. Conversely, 
the countries where group lending and social collateral are most effective display 
collectivist cultural trends. This trend does not stand true across all nations, of course. 
Mexico, for example, was ranked highly collectivistic, but its MFIs found the most 
success utilizing individual lending models (Rosenberg, 2007). Still, the trends suggest 
that social collateral is dependent on the level of collectivism a country’s culture displays.  
C.! Other Risk-Mitigating Tools 
 
 In addition to (sometimes instead of) group lending liability, international micro-
lenders also implement other tools to reduce the risk of their loans and establish 
collateral. Some of the most prevalent tools include:  
•! Meetings with loan group 
•! Meetings with lender 
•! Professional development courses 
•! Tangible collateral 
91
68
89
67
30
15 20
48
25 20
0
20
40
60
80
100
In
di
vi
du
al
ism
Countries
Hofstede"Cultural"Dimensions"By"Lending"Model
Microfinance and Collateral Strategy 19"
MFIs and micro-lenders also use an array of other tools to attempt to reduce default 
risk. Some or all of these features were identified as impactful loan features by Cohen 
(2002); Chakrabary and Bass (2013); and Feigenberg et al. (2010). Each of these works 
assess the effectiveness of one or more of these tools, and the findings differed between 
sources. 
Meetings with group: 
The role that group interaction plays in improving repayment rate has been 
explored in a number of studies. Interestingly, however, the findings have been 
drastically different depending on the country. Van Bastelaer and Leathers (2006) found 
that more frequent meetings had a negative association on loan repayment rates in 
Zambia. In a later study, Feigenberg, Field, and Pande (2010) concluded through their 
study that more frequent group meetings were correlated with lower default rates in India. 
The study concluded that meetings with lenders may be more impactful than group 
lending structures with respect to creating social collateral (Feigenberg et al., 2010).  
The polarized conclusions likely suggest that more research needs to be done on 
the subject. More importantly, they address the possibility that interactions themselves 
can develop relationships and build social collateral. While these studies focus 
specifically on interactions between borrowers within loan-groups, the possible impact of 
other interactions (whether positive or negative) is brought to light.  
Meetings with lender: 
Comparatively, virtually no research has been done on the impact of meetings 
between the borrower and the lender. Many of the same relationship-developing and 
shared-collateral theories applied above could be hypothesized about a borrower and 
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her/his lender. In rural microfinance operations, most borrowers already know their 
lender (or lending manager) personally (Yunus, 1999).  
This gap will be a major focal point for my study. I will work to study and 
address this gap in the research section of this thesis.  
Professional development programs: 
 Professional development programs have widely been correlated with better 
strategic decision-making, more successful ventures, and higher repayment rates. 
Chakrabary and Bass (2013) conclude that providing professional development courses 
are an unwritten duty because of (1) the lack of institutional training available and (2) the 
default risk associated with failed entrepreneurial ventures. Thus, lenders are pressured 
into taking on this significant opperating cost (Chakrabary & Bass, 2013). 
This study also concluded that high levels of foreign direct investment (FDI) 
encourages MFIs to provide entrepreneurial training to its customers. For many locally 
funded and operated MFIs, though, the absence of outside investment makes it more 
difficult to bare the cost of this offering — constantly weighing the operating costs vs. 
default risks (Chakrabary & Bass, 2013).  
While both Chakrabary and Bass (2013), as well as Carr and Tong (2002) agree 
that professional development courses are beneficial for borrowers — helping them 
increase their business acumen and reduce their risk of failure — there has been little 
research comparing the effectiveness of these programs with other loan features available 
to a lender. Often times, lenders make these strategic decisions without understanding of 
the true impact that programs such as personal/professional development courses have on 
borrower success and willingness to repay. 
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Additionally, the voice of the borrower is largely underrepresented with respect to 
the services available to her/him (Cohen, 2002). Because of the importance of these 
decisions for the long-term success of many micro-lenders, it is important to understand 
which services add the most value for borrowers when trade-offs inevitably need to be 
made. 
D.! Applying These Tools in the U.S. 
 
Many microfinance lenders in the U.S. use some or all of the tools mentioned to 
establish collateral in order to mitigate risk and promote repayment. But rather than 
primarily reduce upward pressure on interest rates — by serving as supplementary 
collateral — tools such as business development programs have instead further increased 
upward pressure on interest and reduced overall margins (Chakrabary & Bass, 2013).  
This phenomenon is a result of multiple factors, including but not limited to 
already-high operating costs and social collateral’s relative ineffectiveness in the U.S. 
Nevertheless, this phenomenon leaves lenders with two options: (1) increase interest 
rates, or (2) limit the loan features/collateral tools in place (Chakrabarty & Bass, 2013). 
While Rosenberg (2013) notes that many MFIs have turned to higher interest rates, 
virtually every lender is also forced to face the latter. Chakrabarty and Bass point out that 
the “balancing act” of strategizing which loan features and collateral tools to include 
often leads to U.S. loans offering fewer resources for borrowers and leaving fewer risk-
mitigating tools in place to protect lenders.  
These are both factors to consider when studying the struggles of microfinance in 
the U.S. Lastly, it further increases the importance of strategic decision-making when 
electing which tools/features will ultimately be included in a borrower’s loan package.  
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I will look to provide recommendations for some of these decisions in the final section of 
this thesis.  
E.! Conclusion 
 
Due to the lack of social collateral in the United States, many MFIs turned to 
individual lending models, which put upward pressure on operating costs and interest 
rates. Unable to utilize intangible collateral, lenders have toggled with the use of other 
forms of collateral to mitigate risk and address the issue of higher default rates. However, 
considering the upward pressure that each additional loan/collateral feature places on 
operating costs, lenders are constrained by limited resources. Thus, MFIs are forced to 
balance between including various loan/collateral features, further increasing the 
importance of implementing the most effective and efficient set of loan features.  
Understanding that social collateral likely doesn’t work in the U.S. as a result of a 
combination of (1) social structure/infrastructure, (2) strategic default risk, and (3) 
cultural dimensions, little research has been done to consider other techniques for 
establishing social collateral. Namely, a major gap exists in research surrounding the 
establishment of social collateral through meetings/interactions with lenders.  
Research has been conducted on a number of other sources of collateral (and risk-
mitigation tools) available to MFIs. These features, however, still increase operating costs 
and place pressure on overall profit margins. This leaves lenders to make strategic 
decisions about which loan features to include and which ones to eliminate. In this space, 
neither research nor practice has sought to include the voice of borrowers in determining 
which tools are most effective at influencing repayment. Capturing the voice of the 
borrower will be a fundamental goal of my research methodology.  
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V.! RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
The data used in this study is derived from investigation results from a 
questionnaire (Table 1) distributed to two groups of borrowers. The study was conduct 
from February to March, 2017. This questionnaire was designed to collect high level 
information about repayment tendencies, loan features, and perceived importance of 
various collateral structures. This survey serves to better understand the two borrower 
groups (and their relative similarities/differences) and to work towards better inclusion of 
borrower voice in the decision-making process of lenders.  
The survey contains four overarching sections. The first assesses how often 
borrowers (1) miss/delay a loan payment, (2) meet/interact with their lender, (3) receive 
business/professional development courses, and (4) meet/interact with their loan group (if 
applicable). The second part assesses the perceived importance of a set of six collateral 
features. Similarly, the third section assesses the perceived impact of each collateral 
feature on a borrower’s business operations. Lastly, an open-ended qualitative question is 
posed to understand what ultimately motivates borrowers to repay.  
It is important to note that small adjustments may be made during the collection 
of the data to maintain logical and consistent results. For example, if a borrower omitted 
a “Yes/No” answer for a “Do you have the following collateral?” question, but ultimately 
selected a level of importance for that form of collateral, it was assumed that the answer 
for the first question was “Yes.” As a result, inferable incomplete or missing information 
was altered, in part, to assist the analysis of the results. Only feature-based responses 
were altered in this study. Ultimately, the adjustments allowed for matching sample size 
across various responses, allowing for cleaner and more accurate data analysis.  
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This section will discuss how/what data was selected, how it was analyzed, and 
also what limitations the study contains.  
A.! Data Selection 
 
 In creating and distributing this survey, the goal was to draw comparisons 
between two groups of borrowers in order to provide some recommendations to one or 
both of them, based on the other. Additionally, the survey seeks to identify and quantify 
trends within each group of borrowers. The two groups of borrowers belonged to two 
unique MFIs, which differed in location, reach, and overall success. This section will 
discuss how (and why) each group was selected and the metrics that were measured.  
Samples:  
I administered this survey to two groups of borrowers to compare overarching 
trends within the data. The surveys were administered to two groups of borrowers, from: 
The NC Rural Center in the U.S. and The Women’s Microfinance Initiative (WMI) in 
Uganda. The two groups share some interesting similarities, but differ in the social 
settings in which they operate and many of the loan features that they offer. Below is a 
comparison of the two lenders.  
Table 2: Loan Services & Features, NC Rural Center vs. WMI Uganda 
MFI/Loan Features NC Rural Center WMI Uganda 
Lending Model Individual Lending Model Group Lending Model 
Primary Market Low-Income Rural Borrowers Low-Income Rural Women 
Active Borrowers 67 4,250 
Relative Loan Size $5,000- $25,000 $4,000 - $20,000  
(Adjusted for GDP per Capita) 
Interest Rate U.S. Prime + 4% (8-9%) 10% 
Collateral •! Home/Property Collateral 
•! Credit Score Rating 
•! Promise of Future Loan 
•! Strict Repayment 
•! Social Collateral 
•! Group-Based Collateral 
•! Loan Group Meetings 
•! Promise of Future Loan 
•! Strict Repayment 
Required Meetings With Lender No Yes 
Professional Development Program  One-time-only. Prior to first loan. Yes. Periodic Course Offerings. 
Default Rates ~13% 2-3% 
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These two groups differ significantly, especially in size, location, loan features, 
and overall success. The most important differences for this study are the loan features, 
collateral features, and overall success of the two MFIs — which will be measured in 
default rates. The results from each group will be analyzed to draw correlations between 
various features and certain borrower preference and overall success indicators.  
 While neither is a perfect comparison, each sample was also selected to represent 
two larger groups of lenders. As mentioned in the introduction, the NC Rural Center 
shares a number of similarities with the average U.S. microfinance lender, especially in 
terms of collateral features and default rates. While a number of key differences exist, 
especially considering the limited scale and reach of the NC Rural Center, parallels exist 
between the struggles of the Rural Center and those of the larger U.S. market. 
Additionally, WMI is among the many international MFIs that have enjoyed high 
growth and repayment rates. Of course, with the massive variance in MFI success from 
country-to-country, it would be unwise to use WMI as a reference for the entire 
international microfinance landscape. Instead, it serves as an example of a highly 
successful MFI, largely due to the successful use of social collateral.  
Overall, these two samples will be utilized for comparisons against each other, 
with the ultimate goal of providing recommendations or feedback to the NC Rural 
Center, which has struggled with high default rates. When relevant, some 
recommendations may be extended to MFIs within the United States, though largely 
without the backing of statistically significant data, considering the size and diversity of 
the U.S. microfinance market.  
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Survey Questions: 
 This short questionnaire seeks to measure a number of descriptive and potentially 
predictive metrics, but most importantly it seeks to include the borrower’s voice with 
respect to the effectiveness of various collateral tools. In crafting this survey, I pulled 
from various sources to design each question. In short, five questions are posed to the 
borrowers to assess the following:  
•! Number of late/missed 
payments in the past 2 years. 
•! (Some) Loan Features 
•! Importance of Collateral 
•! Impact of Collateral on 
Business 
•! Motivation to Repay
 
Late/Missed Payments: (Figure 4) 
 While certainly not exact, this question provides a baseline measurement for each 
borrower’s repayment history and serves as a predictor of risk of loan default. Though 
this question is largely based on borrower memory, it still serves as a valuable metric to 
refer back to when considering the impact of the explanatory variables throughout the 
rest of the survey. Additionally, it is used by lenders to determine the potential risk of 
lending to borrowers, which will be explained below.  
Because surveys are collected from two larger groups, this question serves as a 
proxy to quantify loan loss/default on a borrower-to-borrower basis. By assessing how 
many payments a borrower has missed or been late on, we can begin to draw correlations 
between repayment and other factors on a person-to-person basis, rather than MFI-to-
MFI or country-to-country. Thus, this metric can be used as a dependent variable during 
the data-analysis phase.  
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This metric is also used by the NC Rural Association, to assess the potential risk 
of default for individual borrowers. According to Amanda Young, the Director of 
Entrepreneurship at the NC Rural Center, past borrowers are generally placed into one 
three categories when being considered for a follow-up, which help the bank predict the 
risk of future loan loss. While each loan is still reviewed on a case-by-case behavior, this 
metric is used to mitigate risk for borrowers who habitually miss or delay payments.  
Figure 2: NC Rural Center Risk Buckets 
 
**It is extremely rare for a past borrower who classifies as “High Risk” to  
receive a follow-up loan. Some exceptions have been made, however.  
 
 The data collected from this question is valuable because it provides borrower-
specific information with respect to loan default/late payment. It also helps forecast a 
borrower’s potential risk for future default, which is a valuable predictive measure.  
While I will not implement these buckets in my data analysis, because they only apply to 
past NC Rural Center borrowers, these three census-backed buckets allow me to operate 
with the assumption that a borrower with more payments missed or payed late are riskier 
than borrowers with less late or missed payments. Predictably, this will impact my 
recommendations significantly. 
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(Some) Loan Features: 
 The second set of questions asks borrowers how often they (1) meet/interact with 
their lender, (2) receive business/professional development courses, and (3) meet/interact 
with their fellow borrowers. Responses from this question provide two valuable types of 
data. The first serves to identify which (if any) loan features they have. This list is not 
extensive because I set out to focus on a select few features. For both the NC Rural 
Center and WMI, I was able to identify the universal loan features that exist within each, 
so this won’t be novel data. Though, these three features can be used as dummy variables 
if needed.  
 More importantly, this question provides data about the frequency of each of 
these activities. This, much like the first question, will provide borrower-specific 
information, which would otherwise be unavailable. Using responses for each, I will also 
be able to draw connections between borrower opinions (below sections) and the 
frequencies of each activity. These metrics can be used as explanatory variables for 
analyzing relationships with every other response in the survey except those from the 
final (open-ended) question. 
 Lastly, and especially critical to this study, this section introduces 
meetings/interactions with one’s lender. By assessing how often borrowers meet with 
their lenders, a connection will be made to the successive sections to analyze whether 
meetings with lenders can influence borrowers to repay their loans. Thus, the possibility 
of lender meetings as a form of social collateral can be further explored. This is one of 
the focal points of my thesis, because this concept has been virtually ignored in the past.  
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Importance of Collateral: 
 The third and fourth sections are likely the most important in the entire survey. In 
these sections, the borrower is given a voice, which is a major gap in current 
microfinance and collateral research. Borrowers identify which forms of collateral they 
have. These “Yes/No” responses will be used as dummy variables for potential regression 
analyses. Below are the forms of collateral  included:
•! Loan Group Meetings 
•! Meetings with Lender 
•! Strict Repayment Periods 
•! Interest Payments 
•! Home/Property Collateral 
•! Other 
In addition to identifying whether they have each form of collateral listed, 
borrowers will also be asked, “How important is each factor in influencing you to repay 
your loan?” in Section 3 and “How do each of these factors impact your ability to do 
business?” in Section 4.  
The questions in section three will gauge how important each form of collateral is, 
thus translating how effective (or ineffective) each form of collateral is for motivating 
each individual borrower to repay. This section focuses on the effectiveness of the actual 
collateral, which is a key metric for lenders who are faced with mutually exclusive 
collateral-establishment decisions.  
Similarly, section four will assess the impact that collateral features have on 
business, in the eyes of the borrower. This data speaks to both the impact of various 
collateral structures on day-to-day business, but also the perceptual process of each 
borrower. Obviously, if many borrowers find that one form of collateral increases their 
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entrepreneurial success, while effectively motivating them to repay, this should be a 
focus for lenders going forward. 
Motivation to Repay:  
 The final question in this survey seeks to gather information that was either 
overlooked in the survey-creation process or impossible to capture through Likert-Style 
survey questions. These results will be (largely) unquantifiable, but they will still provide 
valuable insight into the minds of the borrowers and what motivates them to ultimately 
repay their loans. Results form this section will occupy the qualitative analysis portion of 
this study.  
B.! Data Analysis 
 
 In order to fully understand and synthesize the survey results, I will use a 
combination of quantitative and qualitative data analysis. Using quantitative data, I will 
first seek to find patterns within each group’s respective results as well as identify and 
compare/contrast data from each of the two borrower groups. Furthermore, I will seek to 
qualitatively analyze the quantitative data results, when applicable. Lastly, I will utilize 
the open-ended section of this questionnaire to draw deeper insights from borrowers and 
generate a more robust analysis.  
Quantitative Analysis  
Quantifying the Data 
As one can note, there are no continuous numerical results on the questionnaire 
(Figure 4). In fact, the majority of the responses, such as level of importance, are 
qualitative in nature. Thus, the first step of my analysis is to quantify the different 
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response points. This will allow for the use of various data-analysis tools on the dataset, 
which was otherwise unfeasible with qualitative responses.  
Still, however, all of the responses throughout the questionnaire are categorical. 
This means borrowers can only fall into one of the designated boxes, rather than 
reporting on a continuous scale. This, in fact, limits some of the analytical tools and 
programs that can be used. Overall, this technique still proves to be a powerful technique 
when analyzing categorical data. Below is a quantification of each response in the 
questionnaire. 
Figure 3: Coding Method for Survey Questions 
 
 This coding method is widely used when analyzing Likert-Style survey results. 
The logic behind this quantification method is far from perfect, but it still serves as an 
effective way to translate the responses numerically. The primary flaw with this method 
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is that it sets rigid, relative standards for a set of subjective responses. Not only does 
“Somewhat Important” carry a different meaning from borrower to borrower, this method 
also treats it as half as important as a response selecting “Important.”  
This is one of the shortcomings of Likert survey questions, but this method still 
stands as the most common and reliable way to gauge subjective thoughts from 
respondents.  So, while it is expected that there is some level of error derived from the 
subjectivity of the response options and their codification, the overall results are 
trustworthy and synthesizable. With the survey data denoted numerically, I then began 
my analysis by observing a set of comparative statistical measures.  
Comparative Statistics: 
 As a preliminary form of analysis, I will compare the results for the two borrower 
groups against each other by section within the survey. Through the use of sample means, 
standard deviations, and medians (when necessary), this comparative statistics section 
will provide an overview of where each microlender stands relative to the other.   
 First, I will utilize two-sample t-testing to compare sample means (across 
responses) between the NC Rural Association borrowers and the WMI borrowers. I will 
compare sample means for (1) late/missed payments, (2) activity frequency, and (3) 
collateral importance.  I will seek to either accept or reject the CD, or null hypothesis, that 
the two sample means are the same. This will allow me to better predict whether 
differences exist between the two populations, based on the samples. These underlying 
differences, if my analysis finds that they exist, must be taken into consideration when 
forming recommendations as well.  
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 It is important to make one key note about the use of means with these survey 
results. As mentioned before, the data collected through this questionnaire is categorical, 
rather than continuous, data. In calculating means, however, the mean will most likely 
exist as a decimal between two categories (e.g. Often (3) < µ = 3.71< Very Often (4)). 
Because these are subjective scales, these means can be treated continuously despite the 
categorical nature of the response options themselves.  
While these comparative statistical methods serve as an effective method for 
displaying and comparing data, there are a few shortcomings with these specific tools. 
Most notable is the limited sample size of this questionnaire, relative to the overall 
population size — especially with the Women’s Microfinance Initiative. This makes it 
difficult to conclude that the sample represents the overall population well, reducing 
confidence intervals and often thwarting attempts to establish statistical significance. The 
issue of sample size will be discussed further in the limitations section below.   
Regression Analysis: 
 To take a step beyond comparative data analysis, I will utilize statistical 
regressions to better understand and predict the relationships between each of the survey 
questions (15 in total). While regression analysis for this type of data does pose some 
challenges, it is still a useful method for analyzing correlation and the statistical 
significance of certain relationships.  
 After the regressions are conducted for each borrower group, the results will be 
compared side-by-side to determine if any similarities, differences, inefficiencies, or 
opportunities exist for either group.  
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Multiple Linear Regression 
I will leverage both multiple and single linear regression models for my data 
analysis. Both by design and as a result of customer insight — which will be elaborated 
upon in the qualitative analysis section —  some survey questions will act as both 
response (dependent) variables and explanatory (independent) variables, depending on 
the regression that is being conducted.  
The multiple linear regression model will be used to analyze how numerous 
factors can explain the variation in late/missed payments. Four separate multiple 
regressions will be conducted to investigate the impact of Section 2, Section 3, and 
Section 4 on loan repayment. Additionally, a larger multiple linear regression will be run 
on the entire dataset. The multiple linear regression model serves to estimate coefficients, 
using the Ordinary Least Squared (OLS) method, which can be written as: 
 EF = '.D + .GHG + .IHI + .JHJ + ⋯+'.LHL + 5F 
 
Where  .D is the intercept, .L is the coefficient associated with HL, an explanatory 
variable for the response variable: EF. This method is applied because it allows us to 
control for a number of factors that could simultaneously impact EF.  
 For this study’s multiple regression analyses, the variables can be defined as 
follows: 
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Table 3: Multiple Regression Models 
WMI (Section 2) Late/Missed 
Payments 
Frequency 
Lender Meetings Business/Prof. 
Dev. Courses 
Loan Group 
Meetings 
Both (Section 3) Late/Missed 
Payments 
Importance 
Loan Group 
Meetings 
Lender 
Meetings 
Strict 
Repayment  
Interest Home/ 
Property 
Both (Section 4) Late/Missed 
Payments 
Impact on Business 
Loan Group 
Meetings 
Lender 
Meetings 
Strict 
Repayment  
Home/Property 
Both Combined Late/Missed 
Payments 
All of the Above 
 
These four regressions will help to highlight any statistically significant 
coefficients with respect to late/missed payments. After conducting the regressions for 
each group, I will also compare the statistically significant coefficients (if any) of each. 
Beyond statistical significance, I will also leverage line-fit/residual plots to identify any 
trends that may provide some added insight, even if they do not prove statistically 
significant. This will likely be out of necessity, considering the limitations of this study. 
Single Regression: 
 In addition to the multiple linear regression, I will also conduct some single 
regressions to directly assess the relationship between sets of variables. The formula for 
multiple linear regressions can be simplified for single regressions to:  
 EF = '.D + .GHG + 5F 
 
As mentioned before, some of the dependent variables for these analyses were 
independent variables for the previous (multiple) regression models. These variables in 
these single regressions were paired based on logical relevance and lender/borrower 
insights. The following single regressions will be carried out: 
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Table 4: Single Regression Models 
Group Single Regression EF - Dependent Variable HL – Independent Variable 
Both 
 
Impact of Lender 
Meetings/Interactions  
(Importance) 
Importance in 
Influencing Repayment 
(Section 2) 
Frequency of 
Meeting/Interaction 
WMI Impact of Loan Group Mtgs. 
(Importance) 
Importance in 
Influencing Repayment  
Frequency of Loan Group 
Meeting/Interaction 
Both Impact of Lender 
Mtgs./Interactions  
(Business) 
Perceived Impact on 
Business  
Frequency of 
Meeting/Interaction 
WMI Impact of Loan Group Mtgs.  
(Business) 
Perceived Impact on 
Business 
Frequency of 
Meeting/Interaction 
WMI Impact of Business Training 
(Repayment Periods) 
Perceived Impact on 
Business 
Frequency of Business 
Development Course 
Both Average Importance 
(Late/Missed Payments) 
Late/Missed Loan 
Payments 
Average Collateral 
Importance 
NCRC Home/Property Collateral  
(Importance) 
Late/Missed Loan 
Payments 
Importance in Influencing 
Repayment 
*Some regressions can only be run on one borrower group because of the individual vs. group lending 
structure. Additionally, only the NC Rural Center utilizes physical (home/property) collateral. 
 
Qualitative Analysis: 
 In addition to the quantitative portion of my data analysis, I will also qualitatively 
analyze the questionnaire results. This analysis will come from two places in the survey: 
(1) the “other” option at the end of sections three and four, and (2) the open-ended 
question to end the survey. These purely qualitative results will add deeper borrower 
insight into this study and make it more robust.  
 While reading through these two sections, I will be looking for recurring 
comments/themes that may signal a shared opinion among borrowers. I will also be 
searching for signs of cultural difference, namely collectivism vs. individualism. In the 
open ended question — which asks “What motivates you to pay back your loan?” — this 
will manifest itself in the individualistic (wealth, personal responsibility, etc.) or 
collectivistic (helping future borrowers, improving community, etc.) motifs that may 
exist in the responses.  
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 But most importantly, the qualitative responses will serve as a place for borrowers 
to answer questions that I should have asked, but didn’t. The questionnaire creation 
process is inevitably imperfect, and this section may bring to light important phenomenon 
that I may have overlooked completely. This will be the focus of the qualitative analysis 
piece of my research.  
C.! Limitations 
 
 It is important to note that numerous factors and circumstances exist that may 
limit the success of this study and its ability to fully answer the hypotheses posed. The 
most significant limitations for this study are (1) sample size, (2) borrower bias, and (3) 
variables selected/tested.  
 Without a doubt, the biggest limitation of this study is the sample size. Due to 
limited time, funding, and lender cooperation, the sample size for the two borrower 
groups is rather small. This will limit, significantly, my ability to establish statistical 
significance throughout my data analysis. It may be the case, in fact, that the sample size 
limits any statistically significant conclusions to be made. In this case, I will work to 
analyze and synthesize the data to make some observations, though they may need further 
testing to be proven statistically significant.  
 In addition, borrower bias is a limitation that may skew the data one way or 
another, reducing its reliability. Borrowers may show an unwillingness to report negative 
information about themselves, such as late/missed payments, despite the anonymity of 
the survey. Thus, borrowers may misrepresent facts, whether intentionally or not, due to 
internal biases. Furthermore, the subjectivity associated with the questions posed may 
allow for this issue to be exacerbated. One of the biggest limitations with Likert Scale 
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questions is that “often” or “important” have a different meaning from a person-to-person 
or borrower-to-borrower basis. This, however, is simply a risk associated with probing 
and quantifying consumer opinions. Additionally, the memory of borrowers is a potential 
limitation of this study. Borrowers are asked to recall how many late/missed payments 
they have had in the past two years, which opens the door for inaccurate responses. 
 Lastly, while I based my explanatory factors on past research, these factors are 
just some of the many factors that can impact a microfinance borrower. It is possible that 
other statistically significant factors were omitted, or that the factors included are falsely 
given statistical significance based on this error. But, by using other research and lender 
insights as a benchmark for my factors, I hope I have mitigated this risk.  
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VI.! RESULTS 
 
Before diving into the data analysis and key findings, it is important to consider 
the purpose of this research and the reasonable expectations for the significance of its 
results. Understanding the resource constraints and limitations associated with the the 
data-collection process, this study will serve a largely exploratory purpose. Because the 
study seeks to address a major gap in microfinance research and literature, far more 
research would have to be conducted to back up and solidify the findings of this study. 
Additionally, a far wider net would need to be cast in order to draw significant 
conclusions about larger microfinance markets or the international landscape as a whole.  
Nevertheless, by analyzing and comparing the findings from each of these two 
borrower groups, I was able to spot some interesting trends and utilize the tools 
highlighted previously to draw statistically significant associations within the data. In this 
chapter, I will discuss the overall data, my statistically significant findings, and how they 
compared to some of my predictions before the study. In this chapter, I will address: 
•! Comparative & Descriptive Statistics  
•! Results from Multiple & Single Regression Calculations 
•! Findings from Qualitative Analysis  
A.! Comparative & Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Just by taking a high-level look at the questionnaire results, a few noteworthy 
observations can already be made. In this section, I will discuss the results from the 
comparative analysis of sample means for (1) late/missed payments, (2) lender meetings, 
and (3) collateral importance. The following page contains graphics depicting the 
descriptive statistics for the two samples.
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Table 5: Comparative Descriptive Statistics, NC Rural Center vs. WMI-Uganda 
 
 
Table 6: Collateral Importance Breakdown (NC Rural Center)   Table 7: Collateral Importance Breakdown (WMI-Uganda 
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Late/Missed Payments: 
Interestingly, the sample means for the two borrower groups were highly similar 
with respect to the late/missed payments metric. Despite the different loan features and 
collateral structures, the sample means differed by just .03, though the NC Rural Center 
sample’s higher Standard Deviation (1.67) suggests more polarized data than the WMI 
borrower group (1.51). By using standard errors to estimate the population means for 
these two groups, the similarity is highlighted further. The formula can be written as:  ! = # ± %& 
 
Where ! is the population mean, and # ± %& is the sample mean and standard error, 
which are used to estimate how far off the estimation would likely be. Standard Error can 
be calculated by using the following formula: 
 
  %& = ' (    %& = % ( 
 
In this formula, ' represents the standard deviation of the population. Since that 
information is not available, it is acceptable to utilize the standard deviation of the sample 
mean as an estimate.  Below are the calculations for the estimated population mean of 
each borrower group. 
 
 !)*+ = #)*+ ± %&           %& = 1.51 28 = .285          1!)*+ = 1.14 ± 0.285 
 
 !4565 = #4565 ± %&           %& = 1.67 35 = .282          !4565 = 1.17 ± 0.282 
 
 Using this formula, we can estimate with 95% certainty that the population mean 
for the NC Rural Center with respect to late/missed loan payments is between 0.888 and 
1.452. Additionally, we can also estimate with 95% certainty that the population mean for 
Microfinance and Collateral Strategy 42#
WMI-Uganda is between 0.855 and 1.425. Additionally, by conducting a 2-sample t-test, 
we conclude that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference between 
the two population means. Prior to this study, I assumed that the late/missed payments 
would be significantly higher for the NC Rural Center, which it still may be, but the data 
collected does not indicate that there is a significant difference between the two 
populations. It will be important to keep this finding in mind when analyzing how 
different forms of collateral impact the late/missed payment trends for these two samples. 
Lender Meetings: 
 Just at first glance, the sample means for the two borrower groups seem vastly 
different, with respect to how frequently borrowers meet/interact with their lender. The 
NC Rural Center’s sample mean is 1.74 (~Sometimes), compared to WMI’s sample mean 
of 3.64 (Often–Very Often). After conducting the same calculations as above, this 
difference is further highlighted. We can estimate with 95% certainty that the population 
mean for the NC Rural Center with respect to lender meeting/interaction frequency is 
between 1.94 and 1.54. Additionally, we can estimate with 95% certainty that the 
population mean for WMI-Uganda with respect to lender meeting/interaction frequency 
is between 3.39 and 3.89.  
 After conducting a two-sample t-test on these two sample means, we find that the 
difference between the sample means is significant. Thus, we can reject :;, the null 
hypothesis, that the two means are the same. This stark difference between the two 
borrower groups will be a focal point of my discussion and recommendations sections.  
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Collateral Importance: 
 After conducting two-sample t-tests on the level of importance of each type of 
collateral, my findings show that there is no significant difference between the two 
samples with respect to any of the five types of collateral. Before conducting the analysis, 
I predicted that the two sample means were statistically significant with respect to the 
importance of lender meetings/interactions. Lender meetings had an average importance 
of 3.82 (~Important) for WMI-Uganda borrowers, compared to an average importance of 
2.60 (~Somewhat Important) for NC Rural Center borrowers. Despite a seemingly 
significant difference between the two borrower groups in terms of importance for lender 
meetings/interactions, statistical testing determined that we cannot reject :;, the null 
hypothesis, which states that the two population means are the same. This difference in 
sample means, while not significant, does indicate a need for further testing.  
B.! Multiple Regression Calculations 
 
 A number of multiple linear regressions were conducted for this study, seeking to 
explain the number of late/missed payments for each borrower group based on various 
independent variables. Seven multiple regression tests were conducted in all, as shown in 
Table 3, which is repeated below for reference. In this section, I will discuss the findings 
from each of the regressions and compare the results across each borrower group. 
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First Regression: 
 The first regression, which was only run on the WMI-Uganda sample, sought to 
use the frequency of lender meetings, business/professional development course, and loan 
group meetings to explain the change in late/missed payments. This regression was not 
run on NC Rural Center borrowers because the last two independent variables did not 
apply to that sample. After running a multiple regression, the findings showed that the 
frequency of loan group meetings had a negative association with late/missed payments. 
The coefficient (-0.9504) had a P-value (0.00018) that was significant at 5%. This result 
supports the underlying principle that loan group meetings/interactions are designed to 
positively influence loan repayment. These findings also support the findings of 
Feigenberg et al (2010) in their study. 
Second & Third Regression: 
The second and third regressions also featured interesting results, including one 
major similarity. These two regressions — which seek to measure the association 
between the importance of the five collateral features discussed and late/missed payments 
— both found that the importance of lender meetings had a negative association with 
late/missed payments.  The WMI-Uganda regression showed that lender meetings had a 
coefficient of -1.009 and a P-value of 0.00713, which is significant at 5%. Similarly, the 
NC Rural Center regression showed that lender meetings had a coefficient of -0.7799 and 
a P-value of 0.002, which is also significant at 5%. While further data collection is 
necessary, this finding indicates the possibility of lender meetings as a potentially viable 
form of collateral. It should be noted that the number of lender meetings for the NC Rural 
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Center was significantly lower than WMI-Uganda, showing that lender meetings showed 
similar negative association in two significantly different settings. 
Fourth & Fifth Regression: 
 The fourth and fifth regressions sought to establish some association between the 
impact of each collateral feature on business and the late/missed loan payments for each 
borrower group. The results showed that there was no significant association between the 
impact that any of the collateral features had on business (whether positive or negative) 
and late/missed loan payments.  
Sixth & Seventh Regression: 
 The final two multiple regressions combined all of the independent variables 
above, to assess whether any statistically significant association could be found between 
the 12 variables and the number of late/missed payments. The regression found that there 
were no statistically significant variables at either 10% or 5% significance. This was not 
unexpected, considering the sample size of the two survey groups. More expansive 
research might still find that one of the variables has a statistically significant impact on 
loan repayment.  
C.! Single Regression Calculations 
 
 In addition to running multiple regressions, several single linear regressions were 
also conducted to take a deeper look at the individual relationships between certain 
variables within this study. A total of 10 single regressions were conducted, with three 
conducted for each samples (six regressions in total), three conducted on the WMI-
Uganda sample only, and one conducted on the NC Rural Center sample. The table below 
illustrates the results of each regression.  
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Table 8: Single Regression Results, WMI-Uganda vs. NC Rural Center 
Reg. 
No. 
<= - Dependent 
Variable 
>? – Independent 
Variable 
WMI-Uganda 
Result 
NC Rural Center 
Result 
Ex. Importance of 
Meetings (Mtgs.) 
Frequency of 
Meetings (Mtgs.) 
+/−/
o 
Coefficient +/−/
o 
Coefficient 
P-Value P-Value 
1 Importance of 
Lender Mtgs. 
Frequency of Lender 
Mtgs. 
+ 0.517467 + 0.490820 
0.009833** 0.004825** 
2 Business Impact of 
Lender Mtgs. 
Frequency of Lender 
Mtgs. 
o — + 0.258261 
— 0.068886* 
3 Late/Missed Loan 
Payments 
Average Collateral 
Importance 
− -1.321157 o — 
0.008763** — 
4 Importance of Loan 
Group Mtgs. 
Frequency of Loan 
Group Mtgs. 
+ 0.336244 N/A N/A 
0.076706* N/A 
5 Business Impact of 
Loan Group Mtgs. 
Frequency of Loan 
Group Mtgs. 
o — N/A N/A 
— N/A 
6 Business Impact of 
Prof. Courses 
Frequency of Prof. 
Courses 
o — N/A N/A 
— N/A 
7 Late/Missed Loan 
Payments 
Importance of 
Property Collateral 
N/A N/A − -0.596414 
N/A 0.004390** 
*Significant at 10%; **Significant at 5% 
Note: Correlations and P-values for regressions resulting in ‘o’, or no association are omitted for table 
readability. 
 
 Considering that multiple regressions for both WMI-Uganda and the NC Rural 
Center showed a statistically significant association between importance of lender 
meetings and late/missed payments, I anticipated a positive association between 
frequency of lender meetings and importance of lender meetings for both groups as well. 
The first set of regressions supports this, showing that there is, in fact, a positive 
association between frequency of lender meetings and importance of lender meetings for 
both samples. 
Additionally, the second set of regressions identified a positive association 
between the frequency of lender meetings and business impact of lender meetings. The 
positive coefficient is, however, relatively small. This finding is notable because it differs 
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from the regression result for the WMI-Uganda sample, which found no statically 
significant association between the two variables.  
Average collateral was a metric developed based on the results. Average collateral 
calculated the overall average of the importance assigned to each of the collateral features 
combined. This metric helped to identify how important overall collateral was to each 
borrower, and sought to identify if any significant associated existed between this metric 
and late/missed payments. The two regressions run found that there was a negative 
association between average collateral importance and late/missed loan payments for the 
WMI-Uganda sample, but no such association was found for the NC Rural Center 
sample. 
Additionally, an individual regression was conducted to follow up the findings for 
the first multiple regression, which established negative association between frequency of 
loan group meetings and late/missed payments. This regression found a significant 
positive association between frequency of loan group meetings and importance of loan 
group meetings. This finding, too, would support the research conducted by Feigenberg 
et al (2010). 
Lastly, by conducting a single regression on the relationship between importance 
of home/property collateral and late/missed payments, a statistically significant negative 
association was found between the two. No association was found with respect to the 
importance of home/property collateral during any of the multiple regressions, but this 
positive association could signal a potentially significant association between the two 
variables through multiple regression analysis upon further (more robust) research. 
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Generally, individual regression analyses hold less weight than multiple 
regressions due to the low @A1values within each regression analysis. Multiple regressions 
tended to have higher @A, meaning they explain a higher percentage of the change in the 
dependent variable. Still, these individual regressions help to signal potential correlations, 
which likely need to be supported by further research. 
D.! Qualitative Results 
 
In addition to quantitative analysis, this study also included qualitative analysis to 
identify trends that data could not capture or important questions that the survey may not 
have asked. Overall, two notable trends were gathered from conducting qualitative 
analysis of the results: (1) Individualism vs. Collectivism, and (2) Business/professional 
development courses as potential collateral. The first serves to both to support the 
research on cultural dimensions, which was mentioned in the Literature Review, and to 
point out a form of collateral that the survey fails to address. The second, and perhaps 
most intriguing, pointed out a hole in the survey, and highlights an area that requires 
future research. 
Open-Ended Final Question: 
The final question in this survey asks borrowers a simple question: “What 
motivates you to pay back your loan?” in hopes of identifying some trends in the 
responses. This question helped to point out a form of collateral that the survey fails to 
address within the WMI-Uganda borrower group.  Additionally, the results from this data 
provided insight on the differences in cultural dimension between the NC Rural Center 
and the WMI-Uganda borrower groups, specifically with respect to collectivism vs. 
individualism. After reading through the comments, the responses began to fall into three 
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buckets: (1) Comments about promise of future loans, (2) Individualistic comments, and 
(3) Collectivistic comments. The latter two are directly linked, and will be discussed 
separate of the first bucket.  
Promise of Future Loans: 
Between the two borrower groups, the ‘promise of future loans’ differed slightly, 
though it existed for both. For WMI-Uganda borrowers, the promise of future loans exists 
as part of the group-lending structure that WMI utilizes. This indicates a form of 
collateral that was not directly addressed by the survey. While the survey addresses loan 
groups as a form of social collateral, the promise of future loans is not included 
exclusively as its own form of collateral. Of the 28 survey responses, eight mentioned the 
promise of future loans as what motivates them to repay their loans. This indicates, as 
mentioned in the Limitations section, one of the possible explanatory factors that is not 
accounted for in this survey. 
 For the NC Rural Center borrower sample, the responses cite the importance of 
maintaining their credit scores in order to preserve access to future loans. Nineteen 
borrowers cited this as the reason they repay their loans. While the two differ, they could 
both act as potential forms of collateral that are not addressed by the survey questions, 
indicating the need for expanded research with the inclusion of this factor. 
Individualism vs. Collectivism: 
To analyze the differences in cultural dimensions between the two samples, I 
conducted a simple comparison of the two samples, understanding that the results are 
merely exploratory. It is important to note that the analysis of these responses is largely 
subjective. To minimize on personal bias, I used a simple rule to differentiate between 
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individualistically-centered responses and collectivistically-centered responses. If the 
response spoke about internal motivation or self-preservation, it was considered 
individualistic. If the response mentioned other borrowers, future borrowers, or the notion 
of paying-it-forward, it was considered collectivistic. If neither was mentioned, or there 
was a level doubt, I did not place the response in either category.  
For WMI-Uganda borrowers, 13 borrowers had collectivistic responses compared 
to just four with individualistic responses. A few pertinent examples of collectivistic 
responses include: 
•! “I repay because it helps keep the loan program operating to give loans to other 
women. So that others can benefit.” 
•! “I finish it so others can get a loan. I have benefitted from loan program and 
want other women to benefit.” 
•! “I do not want to disappoint or fail friends in the loan group. Once you miss 
payments, you lose respect.” 
The following were among the 13 collectivistic responses for the WMI-Uganda 
borrower sample. Conversely, only two of the borrowers from the NC Rural Center 
group had collectivistic responses, compared to 12 individualistic responses. Some 
examples of individualistic responses include: 
•! “Self-discipline and personal motivation. To keep my business growing.” 
•! “To clear my books and grow my business.” 
 While these responses don’t definitively establish a cultural difference between 
the two borrower groups, it is interesting to note that WMI-Uganda borrowers had far 
more collectivistic responses than individualistic ones, while NC Rural Center borrowers 
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had six times as many individualistic responses as collectivistic ones. These responses 
bring light to the cultural differences between the two. Still, the existence of collectivistic 
responses in the NC Rural Center sample and individualistic responses in the WMI-
Uganda borrower sample indicate that collectivistic and individualistic borrower 
mentality can exist within both countries.  
“Other” Form of Collateral: 
 Another intriguing finding was a powerful trend in the response titled “other” as a 
form of collateral. This question was also designed to capture forms of collateral that this 
survey may have missed. After reading the responses, borrowers in the WMI-Uganda 
sample provided valuable insight with respect to a form of collateral that I, the lender, 
and virtually all of the research surrounding microfinance and collateral seem to have 
overlooked. Surprisingly, 24 of the 28 borrowers entered business/professional 
development courses as an important form of collateral. Furthermore, 20 of the 24 said it 
was an “Extremely Important” factor in influencing them to repay their loan. This 
phenomenon will be discussed further in the discussion section. 
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VII.! DISCUSSION 
 
 In this section, I will discuss the key findings from this study and what the 
takeaways may signal for lenders. Lastly, I will provide a recommendation for the NC 
Rural Center based on these findings.  
A.! Key Findings 
 
 The key findings of this study are that, for both borrower groups, there is a 
significant negative association between the importance of meetings/interactions with 
lenders and late/missed payments. This negative association parallels the relationship that 
would ideally exist between collateral and loan repayment. Additionally, single 
regression analyses found a positive association between frequency of meetings with 
lenders and importance of lender meetings for both borrower samples. These two 
findings highlight an opportunity and the potential action to best capitalize on this 
opportunity.  
 Furthermore, a negative association was found, through the use of a single 
regression, between the importance of home/property collateral and late/missed payments 
fort he NC Rural Center borrower group. It is important to note however, that no 
significant association was found for home/property collateral in any of the multiple 
regressions conducted. Still, this association was significant at 5%, pointing out the need 
for more robust research when examining the association of this variable in the multiple 
regression models. 
 Lastly, none of the multiple or single regressions found any statistically 
significant association with respect to frequency of business/professional development 
courses. There was, however, qualitative data to suggest that business/professional 
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development courses serve as a form of collateral, highlighting a critical opportunity that 
has been largely overlooked.  
B.! Key Takeaways 
 
 While none of the quantitative analyses indicates a causal relationship between 
the explanatory and response variables, a number of key takeaways can be used to signal 
potential opportunities or areas for future research. In this section, I will discuss the key 
takeaways considering the associations made with respect to lender meetings, 
home/property collateral, and the qualitative results with respect to business/professional 
development courses. 
Lender Meetings/Interactions: 
 The statistically significant findings with respect to lender meetings/interactions 
signal a potential opportunity for lenders to reduce default rates. Considering the negative 
association between the importance of lender meetings/interactions and late/missed 
payments for both the NC Rural Center and WMI-Uganda, meetings with lenders seems 
to be a potential form of collateral already in place for both borrower groups. 
Additionally, the significant positive association between frequency of lender meetings 
and the importance of lender meetings/interactions for both borrower groups indicates an 
actionable way to potentially address this opportunity. 
 As mentioned before, the tests conducted do not prove any causal relationships, 
but these results indicate the possibility that lender meetings could serve as a form of 
collateral, and that increasing lender meetings/interactions could serve to increase their 
importance and reduce late/missed payments. These, of course, are all possibilities. 
Further testing would need to be conducted to study the role of collateral importance on 
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reducing late/missed loan payments. Additionally, these results indicate that far more 
research needs to be conducted on how lender meetings can strengthen relationships and 
potentially act as non-group-loan-dependent forms of social collateral. This study simply 
opens the door to this line of study, which has been largely ignored. 
 Overall, however, these results are an encouraging sign that lenders can benefit 
significantly by increasing the frequency of lender meetings/interactions with borrowers, 
whether the exact line of impact has been explicitly defined or not.  
Home/Property Collateral: 
 While none of the multiple regressions identified a statistically significant 
association with respect to home/property collateral and late/missed payments, the 
negative association between the importance of home/property collateral and late/missed 
repayments, using a single regression, indicates the need for more robust research. With a 
larger sample size, it is possible that statistically significant associations can be found 
between the two variables through multiple regression testing. 
 More importantly, this finding indicates the importance of home/property 
collateral in influencing NC Rural Center borrowers to repay their loans. This finding, 
while not a novel discovery, should not be overlooked when deciding what loan features 
to include going forward. 
Business/Professional Development Courses: 
 Considering that neither the multiple regressions nor the single regressions 
identified a significant association between frequency of business/professional 
development courses and late/missed payments, I was surprised to see that 24 borrowers 
had mentioned these courses as a form of collateral — and an extremely important one, at 
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that. After identifying the strong trend that existed within the WMI-Uganda borrower 
sample, I reached out to the loan managers in Uganda, in hopes of gaining further insight 
on how these courses served as a form of collateral for the borrowers. 
Upon following up with some of the respondents, I learned that many borrowers 
see the courses as so valuable, they believe their business would not succeed without 
them. For WMI-Uganda, these courses teach borrowers skills such as budgeting, planning 
into future periods, and much more. It was a surprise to both WMI loan managers and 
myself that these courses were seen as so important they served as a form of collateral. 
This finding, while qualitative, highlights a topic had gone overlooked by the lender for 
years.  
Furthermore, these findings indicate an opportunity that exists to capitalize on this 
form of collateral and increase its efficiency and use.  Featuring high-quality business 
development courses on an incremental basis is a loan feature that a) can be replicated, 
and b) does not rely on social collateral, which may not be easily transferred across 
cultures. Of course, further research must be done to quantify and validate this factor as 
an influential form of collateral, but this finding is an encouraging opportunity for 
lenders, and one that pointed out a major hole in this survey.  
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VIII.! RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 Based on the key findings of this study — and to an extent, the study itself — a 
number of recommendations can be made to the NC Rural Center as it weighs which loan 
features and collateral structures to include in its loans. In working to reduce loan default, 
as well as the number of late/missed payments, I recommend that the NC Rural Center: 
1.! Increase the frequency of lender meetings/interactions. 
2.! Continue the use of home/property collateral. 
3.! Explore offering incremental business/professional development courses. 
4.! Continue studying its borrowers, and including their voice in the decision-
making process. 
A.! Increasing Lender Meetings/Interactions 
 
 Considering the statistically significant (negative) association between importance 
of lender meetings/interactions and late/missed payments, and the (positive) association 
between frequency of lender meetings/interactions and their importance in influencing 
repayment, I recommend that the NC Rural Center increase the lender-to-borrower 
meeting/interactions. It may even be wise for the NC Rural Center to mandate some form 
of lender meeting/interaction to facilitate this change. The NC Rural Center had 
significantly less lender meetings/interactions, on average, than WMI-Uganda. Thus, this 
area serves as an opportunity to potentially decrease the number of late/missed payments 
and ultimately increase the lender’s success. Still, however, further research is necessary 
to support these findings.  
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B.! Home/Property Collateral 
 
 While more robust research needs to be conducted to determine if any statistical 
significance can be found with respect to multiple regression models, the negative 
association through single regression between the importance of home/property collateral 
and late/missed payments is an important finding to keep in mind. If nothing more, this 
finding indicates that home/property collateral is an important feature for NC Rural 
Center borrowers in influencing them to repay their loans. Thus, I recommend that this 
form of collateral be maintained by the NC Rural Center. 
C.! Business/Professional Development Courses: 
 
 Substantial follow-up research is necessary to determine whether the qualitative 
findings from the WMI-Uganda surveys are, in fact, significant and impactful with 
respect to loan repayment. Still, this finding identified an opportunity for lenders to 
utilize business/professional development courses — a pre-existing loan feature for most 
programs — as a form of collateral to further mitigate risk. I recommend that the NC 
Rural Center explore changing its business training offerings to better match that of 
WMI-Uganda. Contingent on findings from follow-up research that support the 
qualitative findings of this study, this change would better position these courses to act as 
both standard loan features and forms of collateral.  
D.! Continuing Borrower Studies 
 
 With respect to all of the recommendations above, it is critical to point out the 
need for further research and the pursuit of deeper borrower insights. This not only 
addresses the exploratory nature of this study and the limitations posed by the small 
sample-size, but also the continued need for the inclusion of the borrower’s voice in the 
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loan-structuring process. This may seem to be an obvious recommendation, but the NC 
Rural Center has conducted its decision-making, largely without the voice of borrowers 
throughout its history. This recommendation can be applied more broadly, as well, 
considering the lack of the borrower’s voice was also a gap identified in the Literature 
Review. 
E.! Caveat: Operating Costs 
 
 It is important to note that these recommendations do not specifically address the 
issue of operating costs. While it is an underlying assumption that the lender will balance 
loan features and collateral structures to minimize operating costs, the direct implications 
of each recommendation on expenses are not addressed. Due, in large part, to the lack of 
transparency with MFIs, operating costs are beyond the scope of this study and its 
recommendations. Strategic decisions will be made on a firm-to-firm basis to minimize 
operating costs and maintain a profit margin. This study simply seeks to identify and 
highlight potentially effective and/or high-potential loan features and collateral structures.  
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IX.! CONCLUSION 
 
 Utilizing group-lending structures and social collateral, microfinance has found 
great success and growth in many regions. In the U.S., however — largely due to high 
default rates and the absence of social collateral — MFIs have struggled to grow and 
succeed like many of their international counterparts. Prior literature has discussed the 
forms of collateral available to microlenders and their potential uses in the U.S. However, 
little research has been conducted exploring lender meetings/interactions as a form of 
collateral. Also, a gap exists in the research conducted to quantify the effectiveness and 
importance of these forms of collateral from the borrower’s perspective. 
 A study was conducted to analyze the relationship between late/missed payments, 
loan features, and collateral structures. The questionnaire was given to two groups of 
borrowers, one from the NC Rural Center and the other from WMI-Uganda. Regression 
analyses of the data indicated that importance of lender meetings, interest payments, and 
home/property collateral importance have a significant negative association with 
late/missed payments, respectively. Additionally, regressions showed frequency of lender 
meetings is positively associated with importance of lender meetings for both groups. 
Furthermore, qualitative analysis showed that a majority of WMI-Uganda borrowers 
considered professional development courses a highly important form of collateral, 
highlighting both an unaddressed variable in the survey and a major opportunity for 
lenders to capitalize on this potential form of collateral. Based on these findings, I 
recommend that the NC Rural Center increase lender-borrower interaction, maintain 
home/property collateral, change the structure and timing of business development 
courses, and continue borrower-focused research going forward. 
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APENDIX A: SAMPLE QUESTIONNAIRE 
Figure 4: Sample Questionnaire 
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APENDIX B: MULTIPLE REGRESSION RESULTS 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Late/Missed Payments 
Table 9: Multiple Regression 1 (Section 2) 
    WMI Uganda 
Independent Variables +/−/o Coefficient 
P-Value 
Frequency of Lender Mtgs. O 0.197376645 
0.430510357 
Frequency of Business/Prof. 
Development Courses 
O -0.13431929 
0.55803064 
Frequency of Loan Group 
Meetings 
− -0.95041155 
0.000181277** 
*Significant at 10%; **Significant at 5% 
 
 
 
   Dependent Variable: Late/Missed Payments 
   Table 10: Multiple Regression 2 (Section 3) 
 NC Rural Center WMI-Uganda 
Independent Variables +/−/o Coefficient +/−/o Coefficient 
P-Value P-Value 
Importance of Loan 
Group Meetings 
N/A N/A O 0.079759817 
N/A 0.737976122 
Importance of Lender 
Meetings 
− -0.779935848   − -1.00928064 
0.002291766** 0.00717231* 
Importance of Strict 
Repayment Periods 
O 0.043630603 O -0.283492784 
0.872303183 -0.283492784 
Importance of Interest 
Rates 
O 0.334123939 O 0.110202182 
0.209865301 0.394730366 
Importance of 
Home/Property Collateral 
O -0.426623121 N/A N/A 
0.233215397 N/A 
  *Significant at 10%; **Significant at 5% 
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   Dependent Variable: Late/Missed Payments 
   Table 11: Multiple Regression 3 (Section 4) 
 NC Rural Center WMI-Uganda 
Independent Variables +/−/o Coefficient +/−/o Coefficient 
P-Value P-Value 
Business Impact of Loan 
Group Meetings 
N/A N/A O -0.063429192 
N/A 0.529175861 
Business Impact of 
Lender Meetings 
O -0.149349473  O -0.311929962 
0.676179573 0.54385423 
Business Impact of Strict 
Repayment Periods 
O 0.586799888 O 0.183864314 
0.174001047 0.731552294 
Business Impact of 
Interest Rates 
O -1.111635166 O -0.345527918 
0.143254587 0.365489458 
Business Impact of 
Home/Property Collateral 
O 0.265966897 N/A N/A 
0.520939825 N/A 
  *Significant at 10%; **Significant at 5% 
 
 
   Dependent Variable: Late/Missed Payments 
   Table 12: Multiple Regression (All) 
 
